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COMMENT

DO COACHES' SHOE CONTRACTS
THREATEN UNIVERSITIES' TAX
EXEMPT STATUS?
JOYCE

E. ACKERBAUM*

The extreme popularity of sports in the college arena has
turned football and basketball into more than just games; today,
college sports are more likely viewed as businesses. These sports
have not only generated a tremendous amount of money for universities, coaches, and endorsement companies, but also a great
deal of attention and scrutiny from the Internal Revenue Service
("IRS" or "Service").
What may be the most current controversy, and the subject of
this paper, are shoe contracts, the effect they may have on colleges
and universities, and the way this type of compensation should be
treated in a tax sense. The term "shoe contracts" refers to the
lucrative endorsement deals that coaches have with various shoe
manufacturers, such as Nike, Reebok, and Converse.1 Generally,
the shoe contracts are negotiated directly between the coach and
the shoe company.2 The company agrees to pay the coach a certain sum of money as a consultant, and provides a supply of shoes,

* Associate, Akerman, Senterfitt & Eidson, PA., Orlando, FL. J.D., 1996,
University of Miami School of Law, B.B.A., 1993, University of Miami School of
Business Administration. The author would like to acknowledge Professor Francis
Hill, University of Miami School of Law, for her insightful instruction and guidance
on this article.
1. It is estimated that Nike has contracts with over 60 college coaches, while
Converse and Reebok have, respectively, 41 and 26 coaches under contract. SPORTS
LAw PRACTICE, COLLEGE COACHES' CoNTRAcrS §6.07 (7)(c) at 507 (citing D. HoFrMAN
AND

M.

GREENBERG, SPoRT$BIz 101, 102 (1989)).

2. Id. at 506. However, there does appear to be a trend away from this type of
contract negotiation to one where the school and the athletic departments are more
directly involved. See infra, note 87.
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clothes, and gym bags in exchange for the coach's team players
wearing the shoes.These compensation arrangements between the coach and the
shoe companies originated through simple principles of supply
and demand. Successful coaches with winning records warrant a
great deal of money-money that universities cannot always
afford to pay, either because of budget limitations or, more plausibly, because of the desire to avoid difficulties with other employees
(i.e., professors and faculty members who are not paid nearly as
much4 ), not to mention the IRS. So where does that leave the university? Usually in an untenable situation with a phenomenal
coach that the school cannot afford to lose, but realistically, cannot
afford to keep either.
Enter the shoe companies. They offer to subsidize the income
paid to the coaches in order to alleviate the problems encountered
by the schools. These companies have no difficulty providing this
"indirect compensation."' Nike Director of Sports Marketing,
Steve Miller, simply puts it, "Why the sham? The bottom line is
we believe our relationship with a university is no different than
companies that provide endowments for a school of business... -"
These arrangements seem to benefit all interested parties, and
everyone is safe and satisfied: the coach receives a large check for
his efforts, the shoe companies gain exposure and increased revenue from the high-proffile teams advertising their product at every
game, and, most importantly, the university does not jeopardize
its tax-exempt status by paying its employees too much. 7 The
IRS, however, is not so easily convinced that these indirect compensation agreements are benign. Indeed, the IRS is concerned
not only about shoe contracts, but also about a number of different
compensation issues arising in the context of colleges and
universities.
The Service's concern is a rather recent development. It was
not until the late 1980's that the IRS decided to target its audit
efforts towards large and complex tax-exempt organizations like
3. Id.
4. When the coach's income is measured against others on campus, such as
highly respected professors in arts and sciences, statistics show the professors
sometimes make one-fifteenth of what the coach does. John Weistart, How Colleges
Can Cash In on Their Coaches, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 1992 at A18.
5. The concept of indirect compensation is explained infra, at pp. 13-22.
6. Rudy Martzke, Nike Says It's OK Starter's On Screen, USA TODAY, Apr. 5,
1994 at 3C.
7. The consequences of paying employees of a tax-exempt organization
unreasonable compensation are discussed infra at pp. 11-13.
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universities. 8 The reason for this concentration, as James J.
McGovern, an IRS Associate Chief Counsel, stated in a speech
before the District of Columbia Bar Counsel on September 12,
1992, stemmed from the fact that "escalating expenses, declining
revenues, and rising demand for services [have caused] many taxexempt organizations... to operate in a much more business-like
fashion." 9 It was obvious that these large tax-exempt organizations were resembling commercial entities and should be treated
accordingly. 10
As a result of this commercial sophistication, and in response
to the need for policing of some exempt organizations, the IRS
decided to conduct audits of these organizations in the same way
as those conducted for "for-profit" corporations." 1 True to their
word, on August 25, 1994, the IRS released final examination
guidelines to be used by its agents during investigations of colleges and universities "Guidelines". 1 2 These Guidelines explore in
8. Attention Class! IRS Issues Examination Guidelines for Colleges and
Universities, 7 ExEMPT ORG. TAX REv. 33 (Jan. 1993). The IRS launched large-scale
audits at some tax-exempt organizations; the first of these occurred in 1990 and was
aimed at hospitals. Id. The Service used teams of agents and industry specialists to
probe all aspects of hospital operations, particularly compliance with the community
benefit standard and financial arrangements with physicians. Milton Cerny and
Eileen M. Mallon, Extensive New IRS Audit GuidelinesIntensify Scrutiny of Colleges
and Universities, 78 J. Tax'n 298 (May 1993). After the Service had begun these
audits, a set of hospital audit guidelines was released. See IRM 7 (10) 69. The
proposed hospital guidelines are reprinted in 5 ExEMPT ORG. REV. 697 (Apr. 1992).
9. Cerny, Id. at 2.
10. In addition to conducting business like for-profit businesses, it was
problematic that there were no checks on disbursements in an exempt organization,
as there existed in a taxable corporation. Jean Wright and Jay H. Rotz, IRS Exempt
OrganizationsCPE Technical Instruction Program Textbook: Chapter I-Reasonable
Compensation (Oct. 1, 1992); available at 94 TNT 70-23. Theoretically, investors in a
public corporation want the highest return possible on their investment, and
therefore have an incentive to examine closely the expenditures made. Id. In a
closely-held corporation, there is a deterrent built in regarding the possibility that the
IRS may recharacterize excessive compensation to directors, officers, and employees
as a dividend which would be non-deductible. Id. The only checks imposed on an
exempt organization are the "inadequate oversight by volunteer boards of directors,
the occasional media inquiry, [and] some activist state attorneys general .... " Id.
11. Id.
12. Announcement 94-112, 1994-37 I.R.B. 1, available electronically at 94 TNT
168-6 (hereinafter "Guidelines"). The Guidelines will apply with respect to three
categories of colleges and universities: (1) private institutions that are tax-exempt
and are not private foundations; (2) public institutions the income of which, other
than unrelated business income, is excluded from federal taxation; and (3) public
institutions the IRS has recognized as tax exempt. BRUCE R. HopxiNs, THE LAw OF

TAx-ExEMrT

ORGANiZATiONS,

JW-TAXEXEM §37.10 (6th ed. 1993).

The first seven universities selected for review were reported to be the University
of Michigan, Michigan State University, University of Nebraska, Princeton
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depth the structure, activities and operations of educational institutions. 13 Special attention will be paid to compensation issuesfor instance, whether the type of compensation plan offered by the
organization is consistent with its exempt status, 14 and whether
its officers, directors, or employees are being paid "unreasonable"
salaries.' 5
The response to the Guidelines was widespread as many universities, American Bar Association members, and other individuals responded and set forth their criticisms.16 However of all
these reactions, one of the most interesting, and possibly most
controversial, issues raised by the Guidelines barely received any
attention from outsiders. That issue is the one calling for disclosure of all outside income by university coaches. Section 342.31
(9) of the Guidelines reads as follows:
Coaches disclosure of outside income-The National Collegiate Athletic Association requires coaches to disclose to
the institution's chief executive officer (via the athletic director) all 'athletically-related income from sources outside the
institution' (e.g., annuities, housing benefits, sports camps,
complimentary-ticket sales or sporting-goods endorsements).
Some of this 'outside'income may, in fact be derived from the
institution or its facilities or from affiliated organizations.17
While this particular issue is granted nominal space and is
scarcely discussed in the Guidelines, there is enough of a hint
from the text to raise major tax implications for colleges and universities. It is apparent that the Service intends to devote time
and study to the way coaches' compensation packages are structured, as well as determine who is responsible for the income
payment.
This Article will explore the possible repercussions resulting
from examination of these arrangements, particularly shoe contracts, and address the question of how these deals pose an issue
University, St. John's University (N.Y.), Stanford University, and Vanderbilt
University. Attention Class! IRS Issues Examination Guidelines for Colleges and
Universities, 7 ExEMPT ORG. TAX REv. 33 (Jan. 1993).
The Guidelines specifically define what type of institution qualifies as a "college,"
a "university," and a "school." For purposes of this paper, the author will employ such

terms synonymously.
13. See Cerny, supra note 8.
14. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 39674 (Oct. 23, 1987).
15. See supra note 10.
16. See, e.g., Universities Comment on Proposed Examination Guidelines, 93
TNT 169-11; ABA Members Criticize University Audit Guidelines, 93 TNT 162-40.

17. Guidelines, supra note 12 (emphasis added).
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol13/iss1/6
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for American universities who wish to continue to qualify for taxexempt status.' 8 Specifically, the author will give an overview of
the purposes and policies surrounding §501 (c)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code (IRC), the provision granting tax-exempt status to
certain organizations that meet the outlined qualifications. This
article will then describe the doctrine of private inurement and
explore under what circumstances an organization's exempt status may be jeopardized when applying this doctrine. Finally, the
author will illustrate the concept of indirect compensation and
explain why this form of compensation to coaches may directly
contribute to the eventual revocation of a university's tax-exempt
status.
SECTION

501(c)(3)

An organization is entitled to exemption from federal income
tax under §501(a) of the IRC if it fits one of the descriptions given
in the subparagraphs of §501(c). 19 The most widely recognized
type of tax-exempt organization is20the charitable or educational
institution, described in §501(c)(3).
Having established that the IRC will allow tax-exemption to
universities, one must look further to see what the Treasury Regulations "Regulations" require in order to qualify as a §501(c)(3)
institution. The necessary components of a tax-exempt university
can be broken down into two major categories: the organization
must be organized, and as well as operated, exclusively for one or
more exempt purposes. 2 ' As long as these two requirements are
met, an educational facility will not confront any exemption
problems.
The first requirement is that every university must be organized exclusively for an exempt purpose. 2 2 Because the subject is
how coaches' compensation issues affect a university's status, the
18. The purpose of this Article is not to question the payment of taxes by the
individual coaches. There is no evidence from this author's research that the coaches
are failing to disclose their total income on their tax returns.
19. Bertrand M. Harding, Jr. and Edgar D. McClellan, Unreasonable
Compensation: The Hidden Issue in the IRS College and University Guidelines, 20

J.C. & U.L. 111 (1993).
20. Id. IRC §501 (c) states:
The following organizations referred to in subsection (a):
(3) Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized
and operated exclusively for... educational purposes ... no part of the net earnings
of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.
21. See Treas. Reg. §1.501(c)(3) - 1(a).
22. Id.
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appropriate inquiry is whether athletic programs serve to further
the exempt purpose of the school, that is, education. It has long
been established that "[c]ollege and university athletics organizations that promote certain aspects of athletic competition have
generally been held to be educational and are thus exempt from
federal income tax."23 An athletic program is considered to be an
integral part of the overall educational activities if it is conducted
for the physical development and betterment of the students.2 4 In
addition, a 1978 technical advice memoranda specifically pointed
out the connection between intercollegiate athletics and education
by stating:
[A]n audience for a game may contribute importantly to
the education of the student-athlete in the development of
his/her physical and inner strength and to the education of
the student body and the community-at-large in heightening
interests in and knowledge about the participating schools.
In regard to the student athlete, the knowledge that an
event is being observed heightens its significance, which
raises the level of both competitive effort and enjoyment.
Attending the game enhances student interest in education
generally and in the institution because such interest is
whetted by exposure to a school's athletic activities. Moreover, the games (and the opportunity to observe them) foster
those feelings of identification, loyalty, and participation
typical of a well-rounded educational experience.2 5
Overall, it is a firmly rooted tenet that athletics promote the welfare of not only the student-athletes, but also of the student body
as a whole, and therefore do not raise any issue with regard to
jeopardizing an educational facility's exempt status.

THE DocmNE OF PRIVATE INUREMENT
The second requirement necessary to maintain tax-exempt
status is that a university must be operated exclusively for one or
more exempt purposes.2 6 When considering the compensation
23. Rev. Rul. 80-296, 1980-2 C.B. 195. See also Erik M. Jensen, Taxation, The
Student Athlete, and the Professionalizationof College Athletics, 1987 UTAH L. REv.

35, 50 (1987) (stating that in 1950, the House Ways and Means Committee and the
Senate Finance Committee asserted that "athletic activities of schools are
substantially related to their educational functions").
24. Rev. Rul. 67-291, 1967-2 C.B. 184.
25. Jensen, supra note 23, at 52 (quoting Tech. Adv. Mem. 78-51-002 (no date
given), 78-51-004 (Aug. 21, 1978), 78-51-005 (no date given), and 78-51-006 (no date
given)).
26. See supra note 21.
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being paid to coaches, this is the area that could raise significant
problems for universities. The Regulations clearly state that "an
organization is not operated exclusively for one or more exempt
purposes if its net earnings inure in whole or in part to the benefit
of private shareholders or individuals."2 7 In simpler terms, "private inurement" in any instance is prohibited.
The policies against private inurement were initially established to protect charitable organizations.
A charitable organization is viewed under common law and
the Internal Revenue Code as a trust whose assets must irrevocably be dedicated to achieving charitable purposes. The inurement
prohibition serves to prevent anyone in a position to do so from
siphoning off any charity's income or assets for personal use.2"
Historically, inurement applied in situations where the value flow
was clear and direct. The most blatant instance of inurement was
found in cases of greed, where a traceable flow of cash went from
contributors to founders of a charitable organization. 29 Throughout the years, this constricted view of inurement has expanded
beyond the inclusion of mere formal relationships and direct cash
flows. Today, the IRS looks for inurement in several different
contexts.
To understand the mechanics of inurement, it is first necessary to delineate when the principles of private inurement are utilized, as opposed to those of "private benefit", as both principles
have legal ramifications that are drastically different. Primarily,
the inurement proscription has no de minimis exception. 0 This
means that the smallest finding of inurement, even "a dollar's
worth,"3 1 in a charitable organization can lead to revocation of its
tax-exempt status.3 2 Conversely, private benefit is tested against
27. Id.
28. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 39862 (Nov. 22, 1991), available at 1991 IRS GCM
LEXIS 39, at *17.
29. HILL AND KiRscrrEN, FEDERAL AND STATE TAXATION OF ExamPT
ORGANIZATION, 2.03[3][b] at 2-84. See, e.g., Bubbling Well Church of Universal Love,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 531 (1980). The founders of the church and their family
members were the only employees of the church. The church received $61,170, a
significant amount of which was spent on the family for large salaries and living
allowances. The Tax Court found inurement because the church could not give any
legitimate reasons to describe the expenditures or detail how they furthered exempt
purposes.
30. See supra note 28, at *24.
31. See supra note 19.
32. See Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 412 F.2d 1197, 1202
(Ct. Cl. 1969); Unitary Mission Church of Long Island v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 507,
513 (1980).
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an "insubstantiality" threshold. 33 If the private benefit passes
this threshold test, then the organization's exempt status will not
be jeopardized.
The second main difference between inurement and benefit
involves to whom the rules apply. When conducting private benefit analysis, the prohibition applies with respect to all kinds of persons and groups. 4 On the other hand, the inurement prohibition
only applies to particular people-namely, those referred to by the
IRC as a "private shareholder or individual" as defined under
§1.501(a)-l(c). This definition states that a "private shareholder
or individual" is one "having a personal and private interest in the
activities of the organization." 35 These people are often referred to
as "insiders" because due to "their particular relationship with an
[they] have an opportunity to control or influence its
organization,
6
3

activities."

Through various rulings, the IRS has further broadened the
definition and application of the term "insiders."3 7 The first of
these rulings occurred with regard to hospital employees."8 The
IRS was faced with the question of whether a hospital that was
exempt under §501(c)(3) "jeopardize[d] its [tax] exempt status by
forming a joint venture with members of its medical staff and selling to the joint venture the gross or net revenue stream derived
from operation of an existing hospital department or service for a
defined period of time."" The IRS reached several conclusions.
33. See Hopkins, supra note 12. Any private benefit arising from a particular
activity must be "incidental," in both a qualitative and quantitative sense, to the
overall public benefit achieved by the activity in order for the organization to remain
exempt. To be qualitatively incidental, a private benefit must occur as a necessary
concomitant of the activity that benefits the public at large; in other words, the benefit
to the public cannot be achieved without necessarily benefiting private individuals.
Such benefits might also be characterized as indirect or unintentional. To be
quantitatively incidental, a benefit must be insubstantial when viewed in relation to
the public benefit conferred by the activity. It is noteworthy that, even though
exemption of the entire organization may be at stake, the private benefit conferred by
an activity or arrangement is balanced only against the public benefit conferred by
that activity or arrangement, not the overall good accomplished by the organization.
See supra note 28, at *35-36 (quoting GCM 37789 (Dec.18, 1978)).
34. See supra note 28, at *31.
35. Treas. Reg. §1.501 (a)-l(c).
36. See supra note 28, at *17-18.
37. See generally Gen. Couns. Mems. 39,498 (April 24, 1986), available in 1986
IRS GCM LEXIS 35; 39670 (Oct. 14, 1987), available in 1987 IRS GCM LEXIS 76;
and 39862 (Nov. 22, 1991), available in 1991 GCM LEXIS 39.
38. Id. at GCMs 39498 and 39862.
39. See supra note 28, at *1.
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First, it embraced a broad definition of "insiders" and stated
that "all physicians on the medical staff of a hospital, as employees or persons with a close professional working association with
the hospital, are persons who have a personal and private interest
in the activities of the hospital, and are subject to the inurement
proscription."4 0 Having established that the physicians were
"insiders," the Service then found that the sale of the revenue
stream from the hospital allowed the net profits to inure to the
benefit of physician investors.41 The Service likened the structure
of these joint ventures to paying dividends on stock, in that the
hospital was giving or selling physicians a proprietary interest in
the hospital's net profits.42 The reasons supporting the IRS's decision were grounded in the belief that the hospitals engaged in
these ventures largely as a means "to retain and reward members
of their medical staffs, to attract their admissions and referral,
and to pre-empt the physicians from investing in or creating a
competing provider."43 Unfortunately for the hospital, none of
these reasons were seen as legitimately furthering its exempt
purpose.
As a result of rulings like these, the Service has clearly established the position it will take when applying its definition of
"insiders." That position is as follows:
[E]mployees or other individuals who have a "close professional working relationship" with the organization with
which they are affiliated have a personal and private interest in the organization sufficient to make them subject to the
inurement proscription, even if they were recruited under
arm's length contracts and are not directors, officers or
otherwise in control of the organization.44
Besides hospital employees, there have also been specific findings that bring college athletic coaches within the realm of this
"insider" definition.4 5 As a result, coaches will be subject to the
40. See supra note 28, at *18; see also GCM 39,498, note 39.
41. See supra note 28, at *29.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See supra note 10.
45. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39670 (Oct. 14, 1987), available at 1987 IRS GCM LEXIS
76. In this situation, the IRS considered several issues, one of which was whether a
deferred compensation plan established by a §501(c)(3) organization, set up for the
benefit of athletic coaches employed by another §501(c)(3) organization, constituted
prohibited inurement of income. The discussion directly focused on whether the
coaches, as persons performing services, were insiders and therefore subject to the
inurement proscription. The Service clearly announced that "all persons performing
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inurement proscription, and, therefore, the compensation they
receive must comply with the applicable rules. When examining
any coach's compensation package to see if inurement is present, a
three-pronged test must be applied:
[I]t is necessary to examine the entire compensation
package ... and determine 1) whether that compensation
package is not merely a device to distribute profits to principals or transform the organization's principal activity into a
joint venture, 2) whether the package is the result of armslength bargaining and 3) whether the compensation constitutes reasonable compensation.4 6
The thrust of any inurement argument in the context of university
coaches receiving indirect compensation falls within the third
prong of the test, and, therefore, that is where the focus of this
analysis shall lie.
The basic principle of reasonable compensation can be stated
simply: an organization can make "reasonable" compensation
payments to its employees without violating the private inurement doctrine and jeopardizing its tax-exempt status.4 7 The Tax
Court has established that "[t]he law places no duty on individuals operating charitable organizations to donate their services;
they are entitled to reasonable compensation for their efforts."4
This statement clearly encompasses college coaches. However,
excessive compensation paid to individuals in a tax-exempt organization can result in private inurement. 49 This is a question of
services for an organization have a personal and private interest and therefore
possess the requisite relationship necessary to find private benefit or inurement." Id.
at *8.
46. See supra note 10.
47. Id. A statutory basis for the reasonableness requirement has been developed
based on I.R.C. §162, which imposes a reasonableness requirement for deductibility of
compensation as a business expense. Id. In Enterprise Equip. Co. v. United States,
161 F. Supp. 590 (Ct. Cl. 1958), the Court of Claims applied the reasoning of §162 to
exempt organizations. Id. The general reasonableness "concept has two prongs: 1) an
amount test, focusing on the reasonableness of the total amount paid; and 2) a
purpose test, examining the services for which the compensation was paid." Id. These
two prongs are not separate issues, focusing on different facts. Id. Rather, the
various factors in a particular situation taken together determine whether either or
both of the tests are satisfied. Id. See also Truth Tabernacle Church, Inc. v.
Commissioner, T.C.M. (CCH) 1989-451, available at 1989 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 451.
For a list of the factors considered in the reasonableness of compensation analysis, see
infra note 50.
48. See Wright and Rotz, supra note 10.
49. See Hopkins, supra note 12.
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fact to be decided on a case-by-case basis. 50 It is important to note
that even if one is paid a reasonable salary, inurement can still be
found based on the fact that the total compensation package is not
reasonable. 5 1 All income must be considered in determining
whether compensation is excessive. 52 For coaches, this means
that the elements of their "package" which are paid by the university must be taken into account and examined against the reasonableness threshold. The source of the income is crucial because if
the money is not derived from the school, it does not get factored
into the inurement equation.
The next section of this article will discuss coaches' compensation packages in the context of indirect compensation arrangements. In doing so, it will describe how the income derived from
shoe contracts may be attributable to a university and the possible
ramifications of such a finding.
INDIRECT COMPENSATION

The Guidelines call for university coaches to reveal to the Service all remuneration provided them and the sources from which
they derive. These items usually comprise what is known as the
coach's compensation "package,"5 3 which includes such things as
annuities, housing benefits, proceeds from sports camps, complimentary-ticket sales, and sporting good endorsements.5 4
The idea of coaches divulging the various components of their
compensation packages is not a novel one. The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) "requires annual disclosure
by a coach to the university president through the athletic director
50. Id. There are several factors the IRS looks at when examining the
reasonableness of compensation in exempt organizations. These can be divided into
two categories: those relating to the employee and those relating to the organization.
When examining the employee, the Service looks at things like control by a family or
founder, availability of comparable services from a third party, nature of the
employee's duties, employee's background and experience, employee's salary history,
employee's contribution to the organization's success, and time devoted to the job.
Factors that are considered relating to the organization include the salary scale of
others in the same line of business, size of the organization, salary scale for employees
generally, and amount of an organization's income devoted to compensation. See
generally Wright and Rotz, supra note 10.
51. See Church of Scientology of Calif. v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 381,492 (1984),
affd. 823 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1015 (1988).
52. Id. at 1319.
53. SPORTS LAW PRACTICE, § 6.01(6) at 454.
54. Guidelines, supra note 12.
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of all athletically-related income."5 5 The purpose of the NCAA's
requirement, however, is distinct from that of the IRS. The NCAA
wants "to monitor the sources of a coach's outside income and to
increase and maintain university control over intercollegiate athletic programs." 5 6 This rule is intended to protect the integrity of
college athletics by ensuring that university presidents are
"informed of possible conflicts of interest and commercial influences on coaches."5 7 There exists between the coach and the university a fiduciary relationship which inherently carries a duty of
loyalty, owed by each to the other, that must continuously be preserved. 58 Basically, the NCAA wants to keep the coaches' judgments honest and independent, and, above all, have them
accountable only to their respective universities, not to any
outside interest groups.5 9
On the other hand, the IRS sees things from a different perspective. While the NCAA is using its disclosure requirements to
ensure that coaches' activities are legal, the IRs' narrower motive
is to determine who is really paying the coaches' compensation. Is
the endorsement income that coaches are receiving merely the
result of a great deal struck with one of the shoe companies, or is
it something more? Could it be that the indirect compensation
arrangements from these outside sources are actually just a disguised method which enables the university to pay the coach addi55. SPORTS LAW PRACTICE §6.07 (8) at 510 (citing FN 262-1991-92 NCAA
Division I Bylaws, Art. 11.2.2). In 1987, the NCAA passed a rule requiring coaches to
inform their institution's chief executive officer of all athletically related income they
receive from sources outside the university. Debra E. Blum, Reform Movement Helps
Institutions Take Control of Lucrative Deals Proposedby Shoe Companies, CHRoN. OF
HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 8, 1993, at A35. "Five years later, the rule was [supplemented]
to require coaches in the NCAA's Divisions I and Hl to receive prior written approval
each year from their college presidents for all athletically related income from outside
sources, and for any use of the institution's name or logo in the endorsement of
products or services for personal gain." Id.
56. SPORTS LAW PRACTICE § 6.07(8) at 512.
57. Id.
58. Martin Greenberg, College Coaching Contracts:A PracticalPerspective, 1
MARQ.

SPORrs L.J. 207 (1991).

59. Id. See also NCAA Division I Bylaws, Art. 11.1.1, which lists the expected
conduct of athletics personnel. The Bylaws state:
individuals employed by or associated with a member institution [must]
administer, conduct, or coach intercollegiate athletics ... with honesty
and sportsmanship at all times so that intercollegiate athletics as a
whole, their institutions and they, as individuals, represent the honor
and dignity of fair play and the generally recognized high standards
associated with wholesome competitive sports.
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tional income?60 That inherently difficult question is the crux of
the new IRS Guidelines, and one issue this paper will attempt to
unravel. After all, the Guidelines directly state that "[s]ome of
this outside income may, in fact, be derived from the institution or
its facilities or from affiliated organizations." 61 The implications
of this notion are staggering for many reasons, but most importantly it comes down to this: if some of a coach's outside compensation, such as the income from shoe contracts, is deemed to be paid
by the university, and if this total package is unreasonable, the
60. The idea of indirect compensation has arisen in other contexts besides that of
a university and its coach. Most notable is the situation emanating from the
National Football League which involved Deion Sanders and his decision to sign with
the San Francisco 49ers. In the 1994 season, Sanders played 14 regular-season
games with the 49ers for only $1.13 million, with a $750,000 bonus when the team
won the Super Bowl. Ira Miller, Deion'sDecisions, SPORTING NEws, Feb. 20, 1995, at
23; see also WASH. PosT, Feb. 17, 1995. According to Bob Dorfman's scouting report,
"Itlhe all-pro defensive back has plenty of marketing smarts-he took less money to
play for a high visibility team with strong championship potential." John Flinn,
Somewhere Out There-The Next Wheaties Coverboy, Chi. Trib. Jan. 29, 1995, at 6.
But did he really receive less money, or was the deal that Nike would cover the
additional expenses necessary to get Sanders to sign so that the 49ers would remain
beneath the salary cap?
The 49ers had a total salary cap allowance of $32,985,000, and already had to
make room underneath the cap by reworking the contracts of Ken Norton and Gary
Plummer. Ken Denlinger, This Cap Fits the 49ers Just Fine, WASH. PoST, Sept. 21,
1994, at D1, 5; see also Larry Weisman, PlanningHelps 49ers Sidestep Cap Hurdles,
USA TODAY, Jan. 18, 1995, at 5C. Obviously, at first glance, Sanders accepted a
smaller contract with the 49ers than he was being offered elsewhere. Most significant
was the $17.1 million, four-year offer from the New Orleans Saints, who were ready to
get rid of four players just to get Sanders to sign. Joseph A- Reaves, Salary Cap-A
Games-Breaker, CHI. Tam., Oct. 4, 1994, at 1. But complaints were filed by NFL
teams, including the Saints, that the 49ers had to be cheating. Specifically, there
were charges that "escalators in Sanders' endorsement contract would make up the
difference for a lower paying deal with the 49ers." Ira Miller, Deion's Decisions,
SPORTING Naws, Feb. 20, 1995, at 23. League sources reported that "Sanders has told
too many people he's going to get his money for him not to get it-somewhere." Ira
Miller, Saints are Fuming-Deion'sDeal Angers Owner, S.F. CHRoN., Sept. 23, 1994,
at El. Many insisted that "Nike... is kicking in a couple of million dollars to make
up the difference, believing its worth it to have Sanders' high profile in the large Bay
Area market." Id. at E5.
The NFL looked into these claims and found nothing. Paul Tagliabue, the NFL
Commissioner, emphatically approved Deion's contract Sanders'Contract Gets Final
Approval, OTTAWA CrrizEN, Sept. 24, 1994, at D6. Tagliabue said he had been assured
that Sanders was not receiving supplemental money from Nike, and directly stated
that "there is an absence of any linkage with any such organization7 (referring to
Nike). Id.
The truth is, how does anybody know that the shoe contract Deion received was
not part of his original contract with San Francisco? The public will probably never
know, but it is interesting to contemplate these indirect compensation arrangements
and be able to recognize them when they arise.
61. Guidelines, supra note 12 Section 342.31(9).
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university could be held in violation of the inurement proscription
and could lose its tax-exempt status. With that in mind, it is necessary to consider what college coaches are actually receiving in
terms of their compensation packages and62 examine these items
within the context of the inurement rules.
College coaches have the potential to earn a lot of money.
Some have fully realized this potential, season after season, and
as a result are sometimes paid more than the university president.6 3 Joe Paterno, the head football coach for Pennsylvania
State University, once said, "What the hell's the matter with a
society that offers a football coach a million dollars?"6 4 The compensation is sometimes justified by the fact that coaching is a profession filled with enormous pressure to win and minimal job
security if in fact this goal is not attained.6 5 Whether or not
coaches deserve high levels of compensation is not the issue; the
relevant fact is that coaches are, in many instances, receiving
them.
The incomes of university coaches vary widely.6 6 One view of
a typical compensation package, however, looks like this: $130,000
salary from the university; $230,000 for hosting summer camps;
$175,000 in shoe endorsement contracts; and $175,000 from local
radio and television shows. 6 7 Coaches also receive fees for speaking engagements and public or personal appearances. In addition,
there are bonuses gained from conference or national championship titles 68 and "related perquisites such as housing, insurance
62. See supra pp. 7-13.
63. 'Mhe university-related income of [elite football and basketball] coaches often
exceeds that of the college president by five times or more. See supra note 4. For
example, the University of Illinois paid its head football coach, John Mackovic, who
also doubled as athletic director, a total of $229,950 in 1991, $149,950 more than it
was paying President Stanley Ikenberry. Ed Sherman, University of Illinois Pays
PresidentLess Than Two Coaches, CHI. TRm., May 15, 1991 at 1.
64. Ray Yasser, A Comprehensive Blueprint for the Reform of Intercollegiate
Athletics, 3 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 123, *22 (1993).
65. There are several sources that discuss the pressures of the coaching
profession and inability for college coaches to receive tenure. Id. See also Steven
Poskanzer, Spotlight on the Coaching Box: The Role of the Athletic Coach within the
Academic Institution, 16 J.C. & U.L. 1, 22-23 (1989).
66. The various statistics on coaches' compensation may not be exact, as the
details of many of these actual figures are closely guarded. However, the author is
using numbers based on sources that reported such information. The exactness of
the numbers is not as important as the general idea that compensation to college
coaches can be quite sizeable.
67. Weistart, supra note 4.
68. If a program wins a national championship, the coach can expect an
additional $300,000 or $400,000 from endorsements, increased summer-camp
attendance and speaking fees. Id.
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premiums, membership in health and country clubs, financial
gifts from alumni and boosters, ...
and the use or the gift of
6
9
automobiles."
For purposes of this paper, the primary interest is the amount
of income generated by coaches on behalf of shoe companies.
Therefore, consider a few of the following compensation arrangements. For instance, Mike Krzyzewski, who coached Duke University to two consecutive NCAA championships, more
affectionately known as "Coach fK,"7 ° is at the top end of the compensation spectrum. He signed a deal with Nike for a $1 million
bonus plus $375,000 a year for the next fifteen years, totaling $6.6
million over the life of the contract. 7 1 In addition, Coach Krzyzenski received options on 200,000 shares of Nike. 72 In 1993, University of North Carolina basketball coach Dean Smith switched over
to Nike for "a $1.7 million, four-year contract . . . after having
endorsed Converse shoes for most of his 32-year career at Carolina."7 3 Jerry Tarkanian, currently with Fresno State University,
had a $150,000 per year deal with Nike while at UNLV. Other
Nike signers include the coaches of Georgetown, Wake Forest,
Florida State, Georgia Tech, Temple, Purdue, Nebraska,
Oklahoma State, and Southern Methodist. 74 Compensation packages with shoe companies other than Nike also reach considerable
sums. For example, Bobby Knight, the basketball coach of the
Indiana Hoosiers, contracted for $200,000 annually from Adidas,
while L.A. Gear was paying Dale Brown, LSU coach, $300,000 a
75
year.
Evidently, shoe contracts provide an enormous amount of
money to the coaches. So where does the idea originate that this
money could actually be deemed to be paid by the university? Perhaps it comes from the notion that any money the coach is generating by using his connection with the university should rightfully
go to the school. After all, the coach is utilizing school assets, such
as its goodwill and the value of its name, to get these contracts in
the first place.7 6 One might wonder why the school does not
demand part of the income derived from these deals with shoe
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
1994 at
74.
75.

SPORTS LAW PRACTIE, COLLEGE COACHING CoNTRAcTs §6.01 (6) at 454.
Rick Reilly, That's Shoe Business, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Apr. 26, 1993, at 76.
Id.
Elizabeth Comte, Rich as Coaches, Forbes, May 24, 1993 at 18.
Robert Lamme, The Old Soft Shoe-Converse, Business North Carolina, Apr.
45.
See supra note 72.
SPORTS LAw PRACTImE, COLLEGE CoAc s' CoNrRAcTs § 6.07(7)(c) at 507.

76. See supra note 64 at *23.
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companies, or alternatively, what the university is getting in
return for deciding to "forgo" this income and confer the benefit on
coaches. The answer is not clear.
However, a perfectly logical explanation would be that the
schools and the coaches realize that the assets, and therefore some
of the profit, belong to the school, but have devised a system
whereby both parties prosper. Under such a system, the school
can avoid any participation in these contracts and have the money
paid directly by the shoe companies to the individual coaches.
Technically, the school is acting as a conduit through which the
money indirectly flows, but the payments are treated as direct
compensation to the coach in which the school has no part. Otherwise, the school would have to receive payment first from the
endorsement companies, then disburse the money to the coach.
This method would raise red flags of inurement from excessive
compensation and embroil the school in taxing difficulties.
The current indirect form of compensation could become a
problem should the Service decide to make it one. The Service
may determine that the university reasonably could have
demanded a certain sum as a result of the endorsement contract,
yet purposefully chose not to do so; effectively, it could find that
the school, in walking away from this potential income, has made
an additional salary payment to its coach. 7
Such a finding by the Service would not be the first of its kind.
In Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner,78 the Service was faced
with the issue of how to treat payments of income taxes, owed by
the employee, but paid for by the employer. In Old Colony, the
American Woolen Company adopted a resolution whereby it
agreed to "pay any and all income taxes, State and Federal, that
[became] due and payable upon the salaries of all the officers of

the company.... ."7 The resolution further provided that officers
"shall receive their salaries or other compensation in full without
deduction on account of income taxes ....
o William M. Wood,
president of the company, was a natural recipient of this benefit.
Pursuant to these resolutions, the company paid Mr. Wood's federal income tax and surtaxes owed on salary and commissions
paid to him by the company for two consecutive years. 8 L
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

See supra note 19, at 117.
279 U.S. 716 (1929).
Id. at 719.
Id- at 720.
Id.
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The Board of Tax Appeals found that these tax payments
were actually additional income to Mr. Wood for those two years.
On review, the Supreme Court was faced with the question of
whether "the payment by the employer of the income taxes assessable against the employee constitute[d] additional taxable income
to such employee."8 2 The Court held that, in fact, the payments
constituted income to the employee. The logic provided by the
Court was that the "payment of the tax by the employers was in
consideration of the services rendered by the employee and was a
gain derived by the employee from his labor; the form of the payment is expressly declared to make no difference.""' The Court
went on to say that "[the discharge by a third person of an obligation to him is equivalent to receipt by the person taxed."" The
situation presented in Old Colony is a perfect example of the way
indirect value flows operate. Moreover, it is a lesson that the IRS
will look at form over substance and not permit individuals or
business entities to disguise forms of payment in an effort to
achieve a desired tax consequence. Just as Mr. Wood in Old Colony was forced to recognize the tax payments as additional
income, a similar argument could be made whereby a university
would have to recognize money being paid to its coaches by the
shoe companies.
An added factor that supports the theory of indirect compensation arrangements is that most universities do not take part in
the negotiation of any contract between the shoe company and the
coach. There are very few schools that have the athletic director
or other officials entering directly into an agreement with a shoe
company and then, in turn, compensating the individual
coaches.85 There have been explicit recommendations in this area
82. Id.
83. Id. at 729 (emphasis added).
84. Id.
85. In 1989, the University of Miami became the first institution to enter into a
direct arrangement with Nike to provide shoes and apparel for all of its intercollegiate
teams. The arrangement was reached between the athletic department and Nike, and
the athletic director then compensated individual coaches. This deal was renewed in
1993. Larry Wahl, The Shoe Fit, TfE SPORTING NEws, Nov. 7, 1994. The second
school to follow UM's example was the University of Southern California. Id.
Overall, there appears to be a growing trend in the area of direct school
involvement. "In response to increased public scrutiny of the big-money deals
between shoe manufacturers and coaches, and a reform movement in college sports
intended to tighten institutions' control over their athletic programs, many shoe deals
are no longer a coach's private affair." Blum, supra note 55. John Swofford, athletic
director at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, sees the trend as more of
an overall "change in philosophy" and feels that these kind of shoe deals should be
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by the Knight Foundation Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics (Knight Foundation), a panel of college presidents, business
people, and lawmakers who set out to provide a blueprint for
reforming college sports."6 In its 1991 report,8 7 the Knight Foundation called for a ban on shoe and equipment contracts with individual coaches.8 8 The report said, "If a company is eager to have
an institution's athletes using its product, it should approach the
institution, not the coach." 9 Obviously, most schools disagree
with the Knight Foundation and prefer a hands-off approach to
these contract negotiations. This is a wise and sensible position
for the schools to take; otherwise, such involvement by the school
would provide additional ammunition for establishing a case of
inurement due to indirect compensation.
In light of all the information presented, it seems that a
strong argument could be made in favor of the IRS finding inurement to a university's athletic coaches. The framework for building this type of argument requires an initial finding that the
money paid by the shoe companies to the coaches is actually
income deemed to be paid by the university. Additionally, all
aspects of the coaches' compensation package provided by the
school must be evaluated against a reasonable compensation standard. If in fact the compensation is excessive, the Service can find
that the earnings of the school have inured to the benefit of the
individual coach and, thus, has grounds for revocation of the
school's tax-exempt status.
In all fairness to the universities, the penalty of revocation
does seem like a drastic measure; it would appear that this is a
situation where the "punishment would not fit the crime," so to
say. However, the law currently provides no other options given a
finding of inurement. There have been proposals by the Treasury
Department of "intermediate sanctions" that do give an alternative course of action. 90
part of a group effort and under institutional oversight. Id. UNC is expected to be the
third school, behind Miami and USC, to enter into a program-wide deal. Id.
86. Blum, supra note 55.
87. The Knight Foundation Commission Report on Intercollegiate Athletics was
entitled "Keeping Faith With the Student Athlete: A New Model for Intercollegiate
Athletics," Mar. 8, 1991.
88. Blum, see supra note 57.
89. Id. (citing the Knight Foundation Commission Report, supra note 87).
90. See generally Robert A. Boisture and Milton Cerny, Treasury Proposes
Intermediate Sanctions on Public Charities and Section 501(c)(4) Organizations,
ExEMPr ORG. TAX REv., Vol. 9, No. 4 (Apr. 1994).
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Under the Treasury proposal, sanctions would apply to transactions in which "insiders" receive "excess benefits." 9 ' "Excess
benefits" are defined as either payments of unreasonable compensation or non-fair-market-value sales, leases, or other exchange
transactions in which the value of the benefit transferred to the
insider exceeds the value of consideration received by the organization. 9 2 Violations would trigger a first-level penalty tax on the
insider and an obligation to correct the violation that, if not discharged within a specified period, would subject the insider to a
much more severe second-level penalty tax.93
This proposal
would make it extremely difficult for the IRS to successfully challenge a compensation agreement negotiated with reasonable care
94
and at arm's length by a charity.
The intermediate sanctions proposal has been well-received,
since it would serve as a tool for the IRS to meaningfully enforce
the law without having to resort to revoking an academic institution's exempt status. The final resolution of the proposal still
remains to be seen.
CONCLUSION

In the Service's attempt to alleviate some of the difficulties of
auditing universities and colleges, the Service has simultaneously
tapped into some new and controversial issues as a result of its
most recent Guidelines. Perhaps the Service will never reach the
issues discussed in this article for fear of opening the proverbial
"can of worms." After all, it is doubtful that the Service or the
colleges will know how to undertake the multitude of problems
that may result, or will even have the desire to implement the
sanctions that are required. On the other hand, the Service may
choose to tackle the possible hurdles raised by the Guidelines and,
as a result, set in motion what very well could be the demise of the
long-standing tradition of tax-exempt universities. Either way,
only time will tell the outcome of this very significant issue.

91. Id
92. Id
93. Id.

94. Id.
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